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Introduction 
It is quite common in qualitative research methodologies to position the research-
er as inseparable from her research object; to highlight that her own being is in 
many ways immersed in, affected by and affecting the systems of meaning he or 
she is studying. The researcher is not, in other words, a detached observer survey-
ing the object at a distance. In gender studies, for instance, the researcher may be 
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expected to reflect on his or her own ‘standpoint’, i.e. on how his or her own con-
ceptions of gender (acquired by his or her scholarship as well as his or her cultural 
background) affect the way he or she formulates the research topic. This entails 
the possibility for the reader to critically assess the broader horizons in which the 
aims, objects and significance of the study are being framed.
One plane among others where this reflexivity is exercised are Foucauldian 
analyses of scientific discourses. Instead of focusing on quiddities (‘What is the 
Foucauldian definition of discursive formation?’) and methodological questions 
(‘How to do Foucauldian discourse analysis?’), I argue that Foucauldian archae-
ology can be seen as a style of writing in which the epistemological foundations 
of research are problematised and destabilised. In this article, I engage with the 
analogue of reflexivity as a movement in the Moebius strip, a topological plane 
where the outside and the inside flow seamlessly into one another. Using my own 
research in the history of educational research as a case example, I describe how 
the object of study (the ‘outside’) surreptitiously turns into my own methodologi-
cal frameworks of doing discursive analysis in educational research – which in 
turn affects the way in which data is organised and is assumed to have informa-
tive value. I seek to point out that when taken to its conclusion, this movement 
amounts to a radical reflexivity1 that destabilises the methodological constants of 
Foucauldian discourse analysis itself.
First, I describe the problematique of reflexivity in qualitative educational re-
search and then argue that in Foucault’s early works, one can find a reflexive form 
of writing about the history of the human sciences as discursive formations. I will 
then bring these points to bear in a description of my own writing on the history 
of educational research.
Reflexivity in Qualitative Research
For decades now, reflexivity has been a stable notion in qualitative methodologies 
within the social sciences and educational research. This term refers to conven-
tions and norms in texts on qualitative methodology that examine how the ob-
serving and interpreting subject is ‘positioned’ vis-á-vis his or her object of study 
and how the context affects his or her interpretation and knowledge thereby con-
structed (Pillow, 2003). This means that the universalised knowing subject, gazing 
as if from nowhere, is repudiated as an unsubstantiated epistemological fiction. 
1 I use this concept with a meaning similar to Caputo’s (2001) term radical hermeneutics.
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Therefore, it is not uncommon to find textbooks on qualitative methodology high-
lighting that identity, life history and broader cultural contexts constitute a ‘stand-
point’2 that delimits the way in which order and meaning are extracted from data 
(see, e.g. Jones, Torres and Arminio, 2013: 40–41; Marshall, Grossman, 2014; Mer-
riam, Tisdell, 2015, 147–149; Scheurich, 2002). 
When supervising theses in education, where such ideas of reflexivity are to 
be adopted, I have observed a potential pitfall in the process of academic writing. 
The challenge of reflexivity may sometimes be compartmentalised into a separate 
subchapter in a research report, and the problematisation of the way in which one’s 
own ‘standpoint’ is involved in, e.g. data interpretation may be left unaddressed 
(see also Pillow, 2003; Sriprakash, Mukhopadhyay, 2015). In extreme cases, this 
may assume an almost mechanical form of going through the motions of quali-
tative research writing by, e.g. briefly mentioning that one is writing as a white, 
middle class heterosexual female, and after mentioning these qualifications the 
theme of methodological reflexivity is left at that. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
discern just how this ‘standpoint’ is reflected in the way one acquires data, identi-
fies discourses and how these can or should be destabilised or interrupted in the 
research process report. In the case of such compartmentalisation, the researcher 
may inadvertently let on that she is transparent to herself, knowing exactly how 
her conceptions about gender, for instance, affect her analysis. This implicitly pre-
supposes just that which many qualitative methodologies seek to deconstruct: the 
detached observer who is neutrally monitoring his or her own relationship with 
the systems of meaning that he or she is inhabiting and analysing.
Recent discussions in so-called post-qualitative methodology have re-galvan-
ised the question of the relationship with the researcher and her object and tackled 
the challenge of respecting the irreducible complexity and obscurity of the entan-
glement between the researcher and his or her object in terms of academic writ-
ing style. This is discernible in the dialogical and deconstructive ways of writing 
that are currently being experimented with and highlight the always unfinished 
and unstable nature of interpreting qualitative data (see, e.g. Freeman et al., 2007; 
Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure, 2013). Eva Bendix Petersen (2015), for example, has 
inserted different voices or alter egos into her writing, challenging and destabi-
lising her own arguments and pointing to the margins and shadows left outside 
her interpretations. This writing style has the effect of destabilising notions of the 
research subject that speaks with a singular ‘voice’ or inhabits a nodal ‘standpoint’ 
2 This is a conceapt used especially in feminist qualitative methodology. The most prominent 
arguments in standpoint theories are covered in Harding (2004; see also, e.g. Henwood, Pidgeon, 
1995; Lather, 1991; Olesen 2011).
Antti Saari132
from which thoughts, observations and interpretations emanate. Moreover, it also 
constantly challenges epistemological assumptions, noting that evidence and data 
are not just ‘given’ but constructed, always renegotiable interpretations.3 
Foucauldian style of archaeology
Michel Foucault (1924–1984), French historian and philosopher, has since his un-
timely death, assumed the position of a classic in the field of human sciences. In 
particular, his works on the genealogy of power, as analysed in Discipline and Pun-
ish and History of Sexuality, are frequently used in studying the forms and func-
tions of power in modern society. 
In educational research, Foucauldian approaches have gained prominence, espe-
cially in educational policy studies in the form of analyses of governmentality. While 
assuming the position of a classic, Foucauldian ideas seem to have been somewhat 
‘normalised’. Bernadette Baker (2007a) argues that while Foucault’s works are impos-
sible to neglect in discussions of power and governance in education, certain con-
cepts like discourse, power/knowledge episteme, governmentality and methodologi-
cal approaches like archaeology and genealogy are sometimes rigidified, i.e. assumed 
to have solid, unproblematic meanings. Now, this may not be an issue when intro-
ducing Foucault’s work to students new to his work. To be sure, there is an expanding 
genre of useful introductions to Foucault’s thought in education, where his ideas and 
concepts are made easily approachable. However, it becomes highly problematic if 
the ‘Foucauldian approach’ becomes a monolith that inhibits the generation of novel 
approaches to educational research. If Foucault’s works are to be relevant in the fu-
ture, they must be kept from solidifying too much into methodological checklists 
and rigid concepts (see also Baker & Heyning, 2004).
Foucault’s own writing is slippery enough to resist easy reification into meth-
odological recipes of, e.g. discourse analysis. Especially in his texts on the history 
of the human sciences, one is hard pressed to find a ‘method’ regarding how Fou-
cault studies scientific discourses. To be sure, he wrote a methodological tome, the 
Archaeology of Knowledge (L’archeologie du savoir 1969) to limn the traces of his 
archaeological approach in his earlier books. In this book, he defines discursive 
formations as distinct groups of statements that share common functions as to 
their objects, subject positions, fields of emergence and structures of argumenta-
3 Petersen (2016) suggests the use of the term ‘capta’ – the captured or picked up – instead of 
‘data’, the received, highlighting the active role of the researcher in constructing evidence. 
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tion (Foucault, 2002: 130–131). Discursive formations operate as the historically 
changing conditions of possibility for knowledge in the human sciences, that is, 
they enable scientific statements to have a truth value (ibid). However, the Archae-
ology of Knowledge is notoriously reluctant about revealing any simple ‘method’ of 
studying discursive formations. The book is rather a catalogue of ideas and heu-
ristical devices (cf. Heikkinen, Simola, 1999),4 and then there is the famous vexed 
denial in the very introduction to the book:
Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write. (Fou-
cault, 2002, 19; cf. Foucault, 2006: xxxviii)
Not that this has kept philosophers of science from trying to ferret out a system 
or method from what he is writing – witness the ever expanding genre of primers 
on Foucauldian approaches.5
Yet, one can also seek to draw inspiration from a style rather than a method 
of archaeology. By the term style, I wish to draw attention to a way of writing and 
organising research text in Foucault’s archaeological works – in this case, to pose 
questions about the history of the human sciences and then to use historical writ-
ing as a means to problematise the very questions that fired the investigation to be-
gin with. This reflexivity, then, is a way of intensifying epistemological paradoxes 
that, for other researchers, might seem like obstacles or dead ends (Baker 2007b; 
2008). While there is a plethora of influential accounts of how Foucault’s approach 
has deeply problematised many existing approaches to the history and philosophy 
of the human sciences (see e.g. Canguilhem, 2006; Hacking, 2002; Veyne, 1997.), 
Foucault’s radically reflexive style has been a somewhat marginal topic in method-
ological discussions of educational research.
In the hermeneutic tradition of the philosophy of the human sciences, it is 
quite common to describe the research process as a hermeneutic circle in which 
the researcher’s expectations (or the horizon of meaning) delimit how data is inter-
preted while, at the same time, data can mold or disrupt these expectations.6 While 
Foucault (2003) himself stringently dissociates his archaeology of discursive for-
4 In his inaugural lecture, the Order of Discourse (1981) Foucault defines different, more 
straightforward outlines for identifying discourses.
5 This does not mean that there are no serious and in-depth critical assessments of Foucault’s 
methodology. For high quality commentaries and criticisms of Foucault’s archaeology of the human 
sciences, see, e.g. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1981), Gutting (1989), Han (2002) and Kusch (1991). 
6 In the philosophy of human sciences, a hermeneutic circle was made known especially by 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Debesay, Nåden, & Slettebø, 2008).
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mations from the hermeneutic tradition, John Caputo has characterised Foucault’s 
approach to the history of the human sciences as ‘radical hermeneutics’ whereby 
the epistemic and ontological fundamentals of historical research are problema-
tised through historical investigation itself (Caputo 2001). Instead of a hermeneu-
tic circle, one might think of an ouroboros, a mythic beast that constantly eats away 
its own tail.
Reflexive style in the History of Madness and the Order of Things
This reflexive movement can be discerned particularly well in Foucault’s two major 
works on the archaeological period, History of Madness (Folie et Déraison: Histoire 
de la folie à l’âge classique, 1961) and the Order of Things (Les Mots et les Cho-
ses, 1966). In the first of these, Foucault studies the emergence of the scientific 
discourse of mental illness. His argumentation reveals a discursive split between 
reason and unreason, which operates as a condition of possibility for a positive 
discourse of mental illnesses. For psy-discourses (i.e. discourses with the prefix 
‘psy’, such as psychiatry and psychology) to be the truth of human existence, they 
have to somehow insulate themselves from the domain of the disorderly and the 
non-discursive on which they surreptitiously stand – the domain which is then 
named madness. In other words, there is a decisive caesura between reason and 
unreason that makes psychological knowledge possible (Foucault, 2006: xxviii–
xxxiii). In this relation, madness is silenced, or it is able to speak only in a distorted 
form through the censorship of scientific discourse, which observes, classifies and 
diagnoses its forms (ibid.: xxviii; Caputo, 2001: 18–19). This is the ‘madness of rea-
son’, the un-scientific and non-rational ground on which the scientific discourse of 
mental illness stands (Foucault, 2006).
Caputo argues that these discursive strategies also resonate in the present; as 
psychology remains a tragically unreflective form of discourse, it cannot examine 
the non-scientific epistemic and ontological grounds of its own existence. Psycho-
logical discourses constantly mark out an external area as unscientific and un-
reasonable, without acknowledging how this secession itself constitutes its own 
positivity (Caputo, 2001).
Yet there is more to the Foucauldian critique of psy discourses. Foucault not 
only criticises psy discourses but also ends up problematising the very possibilities 
of writing a history of madness. Granted, in certain passages of the book, Foucault 
seems to endorse the possibility of a discourse that captures the authentic, pristine 
form of madness before it is mangled and distorted by psychological discourses 
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and institutions (Caputo, 2001: 25).7 However, he also acknowledges that in study-
ing madness, historical writing enters ’an uncomfortable region’, its own ‘limit’ 
(Foucault, 2006: xxvii, xxix–xxx). As an academic text, historical writing remains 
on the side of the reason-unreason binary. Historical knowledge, too, requires 
a similar founding gesture whereby it marks its own outside – an area of an indis-
tinguishable ‘murmur’ (ibid. p. xxxxi) from which historical meaning and facts are 
then extracted. Because of this scission, it is impossible to capture any ‘authentic’ 
form of unreason untarnished by scientific discourse. It is only in this manner that 
the history of madness can begin to speak through discourse, by silencing that 
which is its outside object.
Therefore, Foucault’s approach here does not open up to any ‘qualitative’ ap-
proach that would finally reveal the heretofore obscured, natural forms of mad-
ness. After all, that would only align Foucault with the psy discourses he is criti-
cally studying. It would also make his approach indistinguishable from some of 
the most naïve methodologies among qualitative research, which are oblivious to 
how the act of ‘empowering’ and ‘giving voice’ to what has been thus far silenced is 
also a discursive strategy that delimits how, what and when this voice can emerge 
(see also Baker, 1998; Scott, 1992). 
In the Order of Things (2002), his breakthrough into French philosophical 
pantheon, Foucault studies the discourses that operate as the historical condition 
of possibility for the human sciences. The wide discursive stratum, the episteme, 
governing the modern human sciences is structured along the lines of ‘Man’ (sic) 
as a knowing subject and an object of knowledge. These condition the possibilities 
of representation in a circular fashion. The representations of Man as the knowing 
subject are founded in the context of Man as an object of representations, and vice 
versa. In the modern episteme, then, there is a reflexive movement towards try-
ing to represent representation – to make Man transparent to himself and to gain 
a firm ground for empirical knowledge. However, to start with, this is impossible: 
were the contexts of representations to be represented in discourse, for instance, 
in revealing how representations of classical economics are governed by a cultur-
ally specific idea of a homo economicus, these critical discourses would themselves 
always be founded on a context outside of representation and so on and so forth 
(Foucault, 2002).
Moreover, the knowledge and objects of the human sciences are constituted 
in the modern episteme as thoroughly historical. For instance, the objects of the 
7 This issue was also at stake, inter alia, in the famous dispute between Derrida and Foucault. 
See Custer, Deutscher and Haddad (2016).
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social sciences (value systems, ideologies, social structures) are understood as his-
torically changing. Yet, as the knowing subject (a researcher) is a part of society, 
his or her representations must also be indelibly etched in historically changing 
ideologies. As this circularity remains unacknowledged, knowledge in the human 
sciences is doomed to stick to the critical task of trying to reveal the firm condi-
tions of objective knowledge about human existence.
This structure of Man as the subject and object of knowledge, Foucault sees, 
is about to unravel, and he positions himself as standing on shifting ground (Fou-
cault, 2002: xxiv). At the end of the book, we find his famous declaration that Man 
is like a face drawn in the sand on the edge of the sea, soon to be effaced with 
the rising tide (ibid. p. 422). This results in a radically reflexive movement. Fou-
cault sees himself closing in on that point where the contingency of his own writ-
ing upon that which he is studying starts to emerge. He approaches the historical 
emergence of structuralism and the discursive conditions of possibility for formu-
lating the problems he himself addresses in his book. It is therefore not surprising 
that Foucault originally proposed ‘an archaeology of structuralism’ as a subtitle to 
his book. It might be called anti-history, or anti-science, in the sense that it uses 
the conventions of science to question the possibility of an objective description of 
human existence (cf. O’Farrell, 1989: 36–37).
This reflexivity can also be called a ‘limit attitude’ or a ‘transgressive’ move-
ment (Foucault 1994a, 632; Foucault 1994b). While acknowledging that it is im-
possible to represent the conditions of possibility for the language Foucault him-
self uses to discuss, e.g. the history of madness, this ‘hollowed out void’ (Foucault, 
2006: xxix) can be approached or encircled in a style of writing, using historical 
data that deliberately loosens and weakens the effect of historiographical discourse 
as a neutral, scientific representation that gives voice to madness (Foucault, 2006: 
xxxiv–xxxv). A limit attitude, therefore, does not mean a transgression of limits as 
moving from oppression to emancipation or from error to a deep truth about hu-
man existence. As Gert Biesta (2014: 74–75) notes, ‘there is nothing to learn about 
our true human existence because, if we follow Foucault, we have to give up the 
idea that there is one single true human existence’.
The Moebius Strip
As a way of tying together the threads of the previous sections on Foucauldian 
archaeology, I suggest that Foucault’s style may inspire an approach to writing 
about discourse analysis that could be described with the analogy of a Moebius 
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strip. This is a topological plane with only one surface. It can be easily constructed 
by taking a strip of paper, twisting the other end 180 degrees and then pasting 
the ends of the strip together. Following this, you can take a pen and draw a line 
lengthwise. As you continue drawing this line, you notice that the pen ends up on 
the reverse side of the starting point without even raising it from the paper. Here, 
I liken this movement to the style of doing the history of the human sciences where 
the analysis of discourses past leads the researcher towards questioning his or her 
own present and the ‘standpoints’ from which he or she is writing.
This movement leads to aporias whereby the researcher no longer has a solid 
epistemological ground on which to stand. While this might look like a failure, 
I argue that this might also be read as an opening for new kinds of critical thought. 
Caputo (2001) argues that acknowledging this tension and feeding on it consti-
tutes a ‘night of truth’, a concept borrowed from mysticism. When we arrive at 
this point in research, we lose all positive descriptions of our objects as well as 
ourselves as subjects. Baker (2008), also taking her point of departure from History 
of Madness and mysticism, calls this an ‘apophatic’ style of writing: it affirms and 
then negates its own claims. 
The use of phrases borrowed from mysticism to characterise Foucauldian ar-
chaeology might seem a bit farfetched at first. Yet when reading Foucault’s own 
writing in History of Madness, one cannot avoid the use of terms like ‘void’, ‘noth-
ingness’, and ‘absence’ (Foucault, 2006: xxxi, xxxiii; Foucault, 1994a), which em-
ploy registers of negativity as the inverse side of positive discourses of mental ill-
ness. In this movement, a researcher is constantly ‘speaking away’ his or her object 
of study, avoiding saying anything final or positive about human existence and the 
discourses that seek to capture it (Baker, 2008). Madness, for example, is not an ‘it’ 
at all, but an index of the tension between the positive discourse about an object 
and the ‘silence’ that surrounds it.8
This also poses a double challenge to studying discourses in education. First, 
there is the Foucauldian call that is often used in critical educational research to 
‘always historicize!’ (Peters, 2007: 51) and to study how scientific discourses de-
limit the manner in which educational phenomena, problems and aims can be 
thought about and acted on. Nevertheless, historicisation must also involve asking 
what this historicising does to us – how it governs us and our own truths, includ-
ing the very conditions that give sense to the imperative to historicise (cf. Hacking, 
2002: 4). For postmodern historian Keith Jenkins (2005: 12), 
8 Foucault (2006: xxviii) writes: ‘My intention was not to write a history of that language (of 
psychiatry), but rather draw up the archaeology of that silence’.
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the historian is, inescapably, always part of the picture of the historical past he or she paints. 
And there is no need to worry about this radical subjectivity, nor about the collapse of the old 
subject–object distinction so central to western philosophy and culture. For surely we are now 
mature enough to recognize that what passes for ‘objectivity’ is only ever ‘subjects’, objectifying.
Fig. 1. Moebius strip (source: Wikimedia commons)
In the remaining sections of this article, I will try to provide an example 
of how this reflexivity may operate in the field of education, in particular, the 
history of educational research. As an example, I will use my own study of the 
history of educational research, in which I sought to destabilise the scission 
between the ‘old’ positivistic methodology and the contemporary qualitative 
methodology.
First as tragedy, then as farce: The history of Finnish 
educational research as a case example
In my monograph Kasvatustieteen tiedontahto (Engl. Educational Research and the 
Will to Knowledge, 2011), I sought to write a ‘critical history’ of Finnish educational 
research from 1880 to 1980. What sparked my interest in studying the history of the 
discipline was an oft-repeated concern over its a-historical nature. It seemed that 
Finnish educational research discourses rarely make explicit references to the history 
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of the discipline (Arola, 2012).9 The rare references to this history often have a rather 
sour flavour. In both the Finnish and wider international discourses of qualitative 
methodology, for example, educational research until the 1980s was often dubbed as 
‘positivistic’. This is a vague and highly pejorative term that refers to the hegemony 
of statistical methods and naturalistic ontologies in the field (Saari, 2016).10 For in-
stance, it is often stated that in the 1960s and 1970s, most Finnish journal articles and 
theses in Finnish educational research employed factor analysis, and almost no space 
was given to alternative methodological approaches (Kivirauma, 1998). Naturalistic 
ontologies are said to have been present in the narrow ‘behaviouristic’ theories of 
learning and development widely applied in Finland at the same time.
In wider critiques of the epistemological foundations of educational research, 
positivism is labelled as decontextualised from the complex reality of education 
and, therefore, a reductionist and even ‘naive’ form of empiricism (see e.g. Kinche-
loe, Tobin, 2009; Scott, 1996).When applied to educational practice, this results in 
a ‘culture of positivism’ (Giroux, 1979; 2007) whereby teaching assumes a rather 
mechanistic view. Just as educational research is modelled on the natural sciences 
(e.g. medical or engineering sciences), teaching in positivist discourses is easily 
compared to the professions of an engineer or a doctor (see e.g. Carr, Kemmis, 
1986: 56–57, 60–72; see also Lagemann, 2000; Taubman, 2009).
Thus, having constructed the opponent, it is easy to introduce qualitative 
methods as a welcome antidote – as an array of ‘holistic’ approaches to gathering 
and analysing data that are better able to account for the ‘experiences’ and indi-
vidual ‘meaning-making’ of those examined through interviews or observation.11 
The qualitative turn took place in Finland in the late 1980s (Ahonen, 1998). When 
applied to teaching practice, qualitative studies of education cultivated an under-
standing of the multiple cultural and ideological frameworks of education and au-
tonomous deliberation and action.12 This turn to a qualitative methodology played 
 9 Similar concerns have also been expressed in US educational research (see, e.g. Lagemann, 
2000).
10 The term positivism has assumed a plethora of meanings in the history of social sciences and 
philosophy. In his study on the history of positivism, Peter Halfpenny (1982) found altogether twelve 
distinct definitions for positivism.
11 These binaries are not typical of educational research only, but can also be discerned in wider 
discourses of social research (Oakley, 2000).
12 Although the point cannot be sufficiently rehearsed within the confines of this article, these 
critiques were not only presented in discourses that labeled themselves as decidedly ‘qualitative’. Vari-
ous theoretical and research traditions as different as Anglo-American curriculum studies (Autio, 
2006) and German critical-constructive Didaktik (Klafki, 1998) to critical pedagogy (Kincheloe & 
Tobin, 2009) and action research (Kemmis, Carr, 1986) have made arguments that converge around 
the critique of a mechanistic, seemingly value-free vision of empirical knowledge and its application 
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a significant role in opening the way to many post-approaches (post-structuralism, 
post-humanism) that questioned taken-for-granted epistemological and ontologi-
cal truths of educational research. It is in this space that different discourse ana-
lytic methodologies could also gain a significant position in Finnish educational 
research (see Heikkinen, Huttunen, Niglas, Tynjälä, 2006).
While there certainly is credibility to these critiques of positivism, they also 
entail the risk of blinding methodological discussion in the present to its anteced-
ents in the past, and the epistemic strategies – especially ways of championing the 
role of empirical knowledge in governing education – may be unwittingly repeated 
vis-á-vis positivism. A study of the discourses of Finnish educational research in 
the allegedly positivistic era revealed a more nuanced history than just a decisive 
break between quantitative and qualitative research paradigms. 
It is true that empirical discourses of education emerged in the early twenti-
eth century and gained traction after World War II. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Finnish educational research tradition highlighted quantitative research methods 
more so than most other countries in Europe. Yet the arguments for such em-
pirical methods were at a more general level, surprisingly similar to some of the 
later qualitative categories that had supposedly shed the positivist straitjacket. First 
of all, there was a decisive scission with the pedagogy of the past and those of 
the present and future. The old forms of pedagogy allegedly consisted of ‘specu-
lation’ and ‘metaphysics’, which was to be replaced with ‘systematic observation’ 
and ‘factual knowledge. The discourses of the early twentieth century’s empirical 
educational research insisted that a radically new kind of pedagogical knowledge 
– the kind based on systematic observation and measurement instead of rational 
thinking by the philosopher’s writing desk – could reveal the multifaceted reality 
of schools and child development that the previous approaches, based on tradition 
or speculative knowledge, could not. Whereas the preceding pedagogy allegedly 
imposed norms and standards from outside and above, the new science of educa-
tion enabled teachers to know their pupils’ natural strengths and limitations and 
to adjust teaching to the ‘inner laws’ of psychological and physical development. 
(Saari 2016, pp. 121–124.) This caesura between the past and the present could 
only be declared, and its feasibility assessed from within the discourse that had 
already set the conditions for objective knowledge.
of educational practice that narrows the language and thought of education, reduces the inherent 
complexity of educational phenomena and puts practice into a Procrustean bed of predetermined 
methods of instruction. These have to be replaced by interpretive, historically, politically and cultur-
ally sensitive ways of empirical knowledge and its application to teaching.
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Describing the past of a discipline is open to different kinds of narrative order-
ing, those that accentuate ruptures, revolutions or tensions as well as those high-
lighting stability and continuity. What I found myself engaged with were two con-
trasting ways of writing the history of educational research. The first, more firmly 
established narrative was that of the failure of positivism to capture the complex 
reality of education and an ensuing emancipating break towards qualitative ap-
proaches. The other story that I myself contributing to was a history of repeated 
secession and forgetting. This tradition, time and again, tried to break ties with the 
past, which was characterised by false epistemological assumptions and estrange-
ment from the ‘reality’ of education.
This is reminiscent of Foucault’s notion of ‘repression hypotheses’ (Foucault, 
1980), discernible in many discourses of the human sciences. Discourses of sexual-
ity, for example, often insist that through scientific research, sexuality has finally 
been liberated from centuries of repression. Whereas in the nineteenth century 
sexuality was allegedly smothered – it could not be freely talked about or other-
wise expressed – scientific research by Freud, Reich and Kinsey, among many oth-
ers, has pointed to the wide, natural variety of sexuality and paved the way for its 
‘free’ expression. Problematising this narrative, Foucault pointed out that, actually, 
there was a veritable explosion of discourses about sexuality in the nineteenth cen-
tury. It assumed the guise of a final truth of our own sexuality, which could then 
aid us in adjusting our own being to it, indicating healthy forms of desiring and 
locating dangerous sexual pathologies that threaten the social order and individual 
well-being. (Ibid.) In hindsight, it is easy to argue that these early forms of govern-
ing sexuality were highly repressive, but this begs the question: on what terms can 
our present scientific discourses of sexuality assume an air of ultimate liberation? 
Might they in the future be subjected to same kind of criticism? This repression 
hypothesis whereby scientific discourse renounces the past was not typical of the 
discourse of sexuality alone. Similarly, psychiatry has, since the age of moral treat-
ment in the nineteenth century, changed through repeated revolutions or turns in 
which the old theories and forms of treatment are deemed unscientific and inhu-
mane. (Foucault, 2006: 456–461; cf. Miller, 1986.)
In Finnish educational research, I noticed a similar repetitive discourse in 
which past forms of research were stringently condemned as epistemologically and 
morally outdated, and the empirical gaze was, time and again, trained towards the 
true reality of education, which enables human-centred and efficient education. 
This repetition is rarely noticed, however, because past discourses of educational 
research, which would make this repetition discernible, are by default fenced out 
as illegitimate reference points of contemporary research. It seems that education 
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as a discipline must remember to forget to keep up its legitimacy (Saari, 2016). Per-
haps paying attention to this repetition would not be conducive to upholstering the 
epistemic status of educational research. Maybe it would even amount to pointing 
out a constant failure of the discipline in attaining some of its declared aims. Here, 
it might all too clearly underline Marx’s (1852) famous dictum that history repeats 
itself first as tragedy, then as farce. As failure is repeated, it assumes a comical form, 
threatening the solemn, awe-inspiring character of objective science.
Antinomies of Data
What enabled this kind of archaeology of the discipline to be written was the 
analysis of educational research as discursive formations that have a thoroughly 
historical nature, and which are not critically analysed vis-à-vis an external real-
ity that they should adequately represent, or universal ethical norms that they are 
supposed to serve. However, I felt that as a researcher, I could not pretend to be 
a disinterested spectator of the comedy played out in the discipline. It was here that 
historical writing was starting to fold back on itself. 
It is not at all a given that a historian of science is separate from those discur-
sive constellations, the formation of which he or she is examining. This led me 
to question my own ways of organising documents into discourses and arguing 
about their status as testimonies of the past of educational research. As in the past 
of educational research, there are discourses that organise what can and cannot be 
enunciated, which must be the case with my own writing. 
Foucault, among other scholars during the twentieth century, has accentuated 
that the notion of historical evidence is wrapped around discourses of data col-
lection and ways of linking ‘events’ together to form a narrative. There is nothing 
‘natural’ about them – they are tied to other philosophical and political discourses 
that are themselves historically contingent (Foucault, 2003; White, 1978). There-
fore, a historian of the human sciences can suddenly find him- or herself having 
wandered along the Moebius strip: what was first an ‘outside’ object of analysis has 
surreptitiously turned into an ‘inside’, into a pressing question of the history of 
one’s own truths about the nature of scientific knowledge.
Postmodern theories of historical knowledge have claimed that historical 
discourses have often dealt with historical documents that supposedly represent 
historical ‘reality’ – events, experiences, ideologies – from the same era. In this, 
the fabricated nature of data and its givenness are often obscured (Jenkins, 2005). 
Michel de Certeau (1986, p. 203) writes,
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(Historiographical) discourse gives itself credibility in the name of the ’reality’ it is supposed 
to represent but this authorized appearance of the ’real’ serves precisely to camouflage the very 
practice which in fact determines it. Representation thus disguises the praxis that organizes it.
Indeed, this history of historical ‘fact’ is itself indelibly etched in the history 
of Western academic historiography, which in the nineteenth century began to 
distance itself from allegedly ‘speculative’ and ‘philosophical’ forms of history. Al-
though a more detailed account must be presented elsewhere, a candid case in 
point here is Leopold von Ranke’s (1795–1886) famous demand to account for 
‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’ in historiography, as well as Theodor Mommsen’s 
(1817–1903) distinction between first- and second-hand sources in historical data. 
These worked as incitements to gather ‘authentic’ data and to mute object witness-
es from the era of the studied events. This heralded the age of historical archives in 
which documents, by virtue of their testimony of ‘what actually happened’, would 
break the spell of myths and fables. This new ‘truth’ about history – those rules 
that govern the production of knowledge about the past – functioned as a way to 
condemn preceding ‘unscientific’ history as unreliable testimonies about historical 
events. (Toulmin, Goodfield, 1965: 235–236; cf. Foucault 2002: 7–8.) Thus, there 
was also a necessary outside in historiographical discourses, something erroneous 
relegated to the past.
Archaeology and the French History and Philosophy  
of Science
This was not, however, the end of breaks in the history of historical knowledge. 
Where did these postmodern critiques of historical evidence themselves emerge? 
What discursive conditions of possibility do they have? This is where the history 
of the human sciences and its epistemological discourses started to catch up with 
the critical researcher’s own conceptions of ‘discourse’. While writing my book on 
the history of educational research, I was trying to ferret out some methodological 
landmarks from Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, which had for some time be-
come a classic in discourse analysis methodology. Yet, finding a ‘method’ from this 
book proved near impossible, so I sought another approach and tried to contex-
tualise the book in the French debates over the history and philosophy of science. 
Foucault’s archaeological project of the human sciences is a part of the French 
‘historical epistemology’ of Cavailles, Bachelard and Canguilhem, which emerged 
from the perceived problems of French positivist philosophy of science. The press-
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ing question was how to write history of science if there was no simple progress in 
the sciences, and no single method, but a series of upheavals and discontinuities? 
Moreover, how can the sciences then serve as the standard for objective knowl-
edge, which was the stance of the ‘positivist’ philosophy of science? Peña-Guzman 
writes of the vexing questions in the early twentieth century history and philoso-
phy of science:
In this new situation, philosophy is ‘pulled down’ from the lofty heights of its idealist self-un-
derstanding (where it exists as a catholic theory of all possible knowledge) and into the trenches 
of social life (where it can only exist as one discipline among many). And in this new world—
which is our world — the surest sign that an entire age of philosophy has come to pass is the fact 
that philosophy’s most pressing concerns have shifted; that the problems that once served as its 
core points of reference have given way to a new set of problems that more accurately reflect its 
new social and historical conditions of actuality (Peña-Guzmán, 2016: 175).
In relation to this shift, the early twentieth century French epistemology of, e.g. 
Bachelard and Canguilhem abandoned the a priori theory of knowledge. In other 
words, they gave up the search for defining the universal characteristics of the 
knowing subject as a normative foundation of objective experience and scientific 
reasoning. This is not to say that there are no normative principles at all – only that 
they are historically changing. Subjective experience in, e.g. psychiatric observa-
tion is not just anything; it is governed by rules (ibid., p. 177).
From this, it follows that the locus of knowledge is not sought in the rational 
subject and his or her lived experience but, rather, on anonymous historical for-
mations, concepts and theories, those that Foucault would later call the historical 
a priori (ibid., p. 177).13 This fermentation around the history of science opened up 
an intellectual space where the Foucauldian concept of discourse would eventually 
emerge, and its significance in problematising previous epistemological assump-
tions governing the history of ideas and the sciences could be identified.
For me, this was the key to flush out the methodological gist of Foucault’s anal-
ysis of the history of scientific research as discourses. In Archeology of Knowledge, 
one can find a stern dismissal of the history of the ideas of the early twentieth cen-
tury. Foucault situates his work on the other side of a radical break in the history 
13 See, e.g. Georges Canguilhem’s On the Normal and the Pathological (1978). Outside of the 
French epistemology circle, the anonymous practices governing the formation of scientific objects, 
concepts and arguments can be found in Ludwik Fleck’s classic Genesis and Development of a Scien-
tific Fact (2012). Thomas S. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, another famous work on the 
historical nature of scientific reasoning, was founded on Fleck’s ideas and those similar to French 
epistemologists (Hacking, 2002).
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of historical research that seeks to get rid of the many epistemic givens of study-
ing the past (Foucault, 2002: 4–6). According to Foucault, many new currents in 
French history converge around the problem of the historical ‘document’: 
(…) ever since a discipline such as history has existed, documents have been used, questioned, 
and have given rise to questions; scholars have asked not only what these documents meant, 
but also whether they were telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so, 
whether they were sincere or deliberately misleading, well informed or ignorant, authentic or 
tampered with. (Foucault, 2002: 6–7) 
Foucault claims that historical documents (books, letters or even buildings) 
were, until now, understood as traces that did not have a positive existence in 
themselves. Instead, they pointed to something more substantial in the past from 
which they emanated, and which should be interpreted or deciphered from the 
document (ibid.: 7–8). This was the foundation for writing the ‘total history’ of 
‘civilizations’ and ‘Zeitgeist’ and for deciphering forms of rationality and progress 
in the history of ideas and the sciences. If, however, the documents are treated in 
their positivity as ‘monuments’, without adding anything to them and tracing them 
back to something that is no longer there, then a whole new form of historical 
writing will appear, and new ways of ordering historical data will be made pos-
sible (ibid.: 10–12). These new currents for treating data, partially intersecting with 
structuralist ideas, are the foundation for Foucault’s understanding of discourses 
(ibid.: 23–33). He insists that discourses must be reconstructed by allowing reg-
ularities between statements to appear without reducing them to an organising 
meaning, intention, interest or other referent. Instead, discourses are organised 
by functions (of subject positions, objects, modes of commentary and argumenta-
tion) rather than meanings (ibid.: 33, 119). 
The Night of Truth
While situating the analysis of discourses in the context of French philosophy and 
the history of science was a way to better understand the ideas presented in Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge, I began to have doubts about whether an archaeological 
approach to the history of positivist educational research was epistemologically 
viable. What if an archaeology of educational research discourses was, mutatis mu-
tandis, only a variation of a theme repeated in a previous history of understanding 
data and evidence in the human sciences? What if the very insistence on a break 
with the past history of ideas was itself only an ingenuous discursive strategy di-
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recting attention away from this repetition? After all, Foucault’s characterisations 
of identifying ‘monuments’ seemed to betray an insistence on that which is imme-
diately given (i.e. the positive) in experience, without recourse to anything more 
substantial behind it. Was this not a variation of the ‘myth of the given’, so often 
identified in critiques of positivism? While this emerged to me as a vague doubt at 
first, it soon found support in significant critiques of Foucault’s work.
Richard Rorty, for example, is well known for his critique of the metaphor of the 
mind—as a reflective mirror of the outside world—being the foundation of many 
dominant epistemologies, including various forms of positivism (Rorty, 1980). Rorty 
claims that there is also a myth of the given operating in Foucault’s archaeology. 
Foucault treats his discourses as identifiable without any epistemological or ethical 
framework of interpretation (Rorty, 1981). Moreover, Jürgen Habermas, who be-
came known, among other works, for his study of the different tacit ideologies and 
interests operating behind different sciences (Habermas, 1978), has also discovered 
an ideology behind Foucault’s seemingly neutral epistemological claims. For Haber-
mas, Foucault’s archaeology sought to demystify the history of science, strip it of its 
guises of rationality and progress: ‘Under the stoic gaze of the archaeologist, history 
hardens into an iceberg covered with the crystalline forms of arbitrary formations 
of discourses’ (Habermas, 1987: 253, emphasis original). Here, Habermas acknowl-
edges Foucault’s critique of science, but argues that unbeknownst to himself, Fou-
cault subscribes to ideas of empiricism and the fact-value distinction that he should 
be challenging.14 Foucault seeks to position himself as a neutral observer, outside of 
what he is studying. For Habermas, this produces an unsolvable aporia whereby the 
archaeologist cannot acknowledge, describe and vindicate the conditions of possibil-
ity for his own research methods (ibid.: 277–279).
Just how does this differ from the empiricist foundations of positivism that fo-
cus on what is given in experience? How does it differ from the ethos that seeks to 
demystify and revolutionise our thinking through empirical knowledge, relegat-
ing our unfounded ideas to the past? It became painfully clear that I did not know 
what I was doing. In a sense, this was akin to a night of truth, a moment of de-
subjectivation, where my position as an author of my own scientific writing began 
to dissipate. Where does the field of the Other – the anonymous discourses about 
history and historical evidence – end, and the thinking, observing, classifying and 
writing ‘I’ begin? It slowly dawned on me that archaeology was a discourse of dis-
course, formed in another space and time, that had passed through me unchecked. 
14 In the Order of Things (2002), he described positivist empiricism as ‘pre-critical naïveté that 
could not critically examine its own conditions of possibility.
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In the process of writing my monograph, I discovered that I had compartmen-
talised ‘methodology’ as a distinct chapter in my manuscript, separated from the 
‘data’ it was used to analyse and from the writing subject. Now, these insulating 
walls were beginning to crumble, and different sections started to bleed into one 
another. What I considered to be an outside object of study had now turned into 
the inside, a pressing question over my own framework of understanding and or-
ganising data into discourses. This forced me to change the way I wrote about the 
discourses of empiricism in educational research. It had to be repeatedly acknowl-
edged as both an object and a subject in the process of writing.
So, does this movement amount to a failure? What the analogy of a Moebius 
strip can contribute is a way of avoiding some of these dichotomies of inside and 
outside. This means letting go of the notion of a single ‘standpoint’ to be identified, 
or an exhaustive ‘positioning’ of the writing subject vis-á-vis the object, for stand-
point, as a word, seems to index an identifiable origin for stating claims and their 
conditions of emergence. In Foucauldian reflexivity, there is also a radical unde-
cidability to epistemic claims regarding data. It is not vouching for the possibility 
of absolute accuracy in representing historical ‘events’, ‘experiences’ or ‘discursive 
formations’ of the past.
Instead, the Moebius strip points towards a style of writing in the history of the 
human sciences that does not seek to compartmentalise the subject and object of 
research into different containers and to concern itself with firmly insulating one 
from the other. It openly admits that the history of scientific research is being criti-
cised by using some of its own methods. This way, it amounts to an epistemological 
reflexivity and undecidability by both vindicating and destabilising the status and 
value of empirical data and the position of the subject (cf. Jenkins, 2005: 12) 
In light of this reflexivity, we can also understand ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
(Qu’est-ce-que les Lumieres?), one of Foucault’s last texts. Here, he aligns himself 
with the tradition of the Enlightenment while proposing a different attitude of 
criticism. This attitude does not only historicise and pluralise, but also presents 
history to the historian and the reader as a mirror to study and question one’s 
own present-day experience. It also means valorising open questions about human 
existence over fixed answers. Therefore, continuing Enlightenment thought, ‘this 
(…) tradition of critique poses a question: What is our own present? What is the 
realm of possible experience?’ This is what Foucault calls ‘an ontology of the pres-
ent, the ontology of ourselves’. (Foucault, 1994c: 587.)
One should also recall that these tenets do not mean that ’anything goes’, that 
one form of writing about the history of educational research is just as good as any 
other. This would miss the point, and it would endanger a fruitful discussion with 
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the community of educational researchers. There are still rules and hierarchies that 
delimit and organise different arguments about history according to their plausi-
bility. What is relinquished are visions of an ’ultimate foundation’ to knowledge, 
a ‘definitive closure’ to the truth about past events (Jenkins, 2005: 13–14).
Concluding Remarks: The Value of Not Knowing Who  
and Where We Are
A ‘method’ of gathering and analysing qualitative data can all too easily be seen 
as a tool or instrument, separated from the writing subject. Discourse analysis, for 
example, might be easily regarded as a vehicle that gets the researcher from point 
A to B, thereby having no effect on the manner in which the researcher is thinking 
or writing. Yet, many notable methodologists and philosophers of science have 
spoken against this kind of methodological fetishism that directs attention away 
from the style and innovativeness of thinking and writing (see, for example Fey-
erabend, 1988; Gadamer, 1979).
The history of scientific knowledge provides an enlightening case in point for 
studying what is at stake in the epistemological reflexivity of academic writing. 
Foucault’s archaeological works of the 1960s have been somewhat marginal in the 
mainstream educational research on, e.g. governmentality. While not providing 
a clear-cut recipe for conducting critical discourse analysis, they provide insights 
into how research can reflexively focus on and destabilise the sometimes taken-
for-granted epistemological dichotomies between outside and inside, object and 
subject.
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